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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In tlir Matter of the Estate of
lL\ Y:\IOND H. -WILLSON,
Deceased,
EDXA R. WILLSON, Executrix,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.
12501

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

Brief of Defendant .. Respondent
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District
Court of the Second Judicial District, Weber County,
State of Utah, upholding inheritance tax assessed by the
Utah State Tax Commission upon the assets of the estate
of Raymond H. Willson, deceased, in the amount of $17,362.85. Plaintiff had claimed that $1,937.78 of that
amount had been improperly assessed.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT
The case was heard pursuant to an order to show
rnusr issued upon the petition of plaintiff, executrix of
the estate of Raymond H. Willson, deceased. On April
1

7, 1971, Judge Ronald C. Hyde of the Second Judicial
District Court entered an order upholding the tax assP:>>mcnt of Utah State Tax Commission. (Hereinafter term.
ed "the Commission").
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the jndt,'1.nent of the district
court reYerse'd and seeks a declaration that the Conunission approye of and consent to the State of Utah Inheritance Tax Return as filed by plaintiff; that the Comrni,.
sion approve the sum of $15,425.07 as the full amount
of Utah inheritance tax due upon the aforesaid estate:
and, that the Commission issue waivers of lien on all
the assets of such estate.
Defendant seeks an affirmancc of the decision of
the district court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant agrees with the facts as set forth in plai11tiff 's brief, and believes that there arc no factual issue'
in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S INT"B_JREST IN THE
PROPERTY IS AN INTEREST IN PERSONAL'!'\
WITH RESPECT TO WHICH PLAINTIFF HAS Nil
DOWER RIGHT, AND
INHERITANCE TA.\
2

ASSESSJ£D AGAINST SUCH PROPERTY BY THE
('011MTSSION AND APPROVED BY THE DISTRICT COURT IS PROPERLY DUE.
The district court held that the doctrine of equitable conversion applied at the time the agreement
in ciuestion became an enforceable executory contract to
r·om·Prt the plaintiff's interest from an interest in real
property to an interest in personalty to which dower
does not attach. Defendant urges that this is a correct
awlication of the doctrine of equitable conversion. This
application is explained in 1 Pomeroy, Eqitity Jurisprudence § 105 (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as Pomeroy]
at 135-36:
. . . Applying one of its fruitful principles,
that what ought to be done is regarded as done,
equity says that from the contract, even while yet
• execntory, the vendee acc1uires a 'real' right, a
right of propert_\· in the land, which though lacking
a legal title, and therefore equitable only, is none
the less the real, beneficial o-wnership, subject,
however, to a lien of the vendor as security for the
purchase price as long as that remains unpaid.
This property in the land, upon the death of the
vendee, descends to his heirs, or passes to his
devisees, and is liable to the dower of his widow
(emphasis added). The vendor still holds the legal
title, but only as a trustee, and he in turn acquires
an equitable ownership of the purchase-money;
his property, as viewed by equity, is no longer
rPal estate, in the land, but personal estate, in the
price, and if he dies before payment, it goes to
his administrators, and not to his heirs. In short,
equity regards the 'hvo contracting parties as
having changed positions, and the original estate
of each as having been "converted," that of the
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vendee from personal into real property, and
that of the vendor from real into personal pro11
erty.
The doctrine is further clarified in 1 Pomeroy § 1.f7
at 200-201:

. . . In all cases of e(1uitable estates, as distinguished from lesser interests, whetlH'r in fee.
for life, or for years, they are in eqnit;.- what lt>gnl
estates are in law; the ownership of the eq1litahl1
estate is regarded by eqnity as the real ow1wn:hi11.
and the legal estate is, as has been said, no more
than the shadow always following the equitaliliestate, which is the suhstance, except where then
is a purchaser for valne and without notice 1d10
has acquired the legal estate. This principle of a
double right, one legal and the other equitalJk
is not confined to equitable rstntes, JlI'o1wrly
!
called; it is the essmtial diarncteristic of ('\'(•r,r
kind of eqnitable interest inferior to estates. Jn
the total ownership resulting from
111
from the operation of the• doctrine of conwrsirm
or from the assignment of things in aC'tion. anil
other interests not assig·nahle at law, and in liPn;.
there is always a legal title or ('State vested in onP
person, recognized by courts of law alone, and an
equitable interest, ownership, or claim, distinct
from a mere right of action or rem('dial right.
vested in anotlwr person, which is recognized, and.
according to the nature, protected or enforcP<l
by courts of equity.
And in 2 Pomeroy

3G8, at 24-25 is found the following

The rJJuitnlJlf interest of the vendor is correlatin
with that of the vendee, his be11cficial interest i11
the land is .r;one, and only the 11aked legal tif/,
remains. whi<'h he holds in tritst for the venrlee,
accompanied, however, by a lien upon the land ai
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security when any of the purchase price remains
unpaid. 'l'his lien, like every other equitable lien,
i:::i not an interest in the land, is neither a jits ad
rem nor a jus in re, but merely an encumbrance.
'l'he vendor is regarded as owner of the purchase
price, and the vendee, before actual payment, is
:::;imply a trustee of the purchase money for him.
carries out this doctrine to its consequence:::;. Although the land should remain in the
po:::i:::;e:::ision and in the legal ownership of the
vendor, yet equity, in administering his whole
property and assets, looks not upon the land as
land, - for that has gone to the vendee, - but
looks upon the money which has taken the place of
the land; that is, so far as the land is a representative of the vendor's property, so far as it is an
element in his total assets, equity treats it as
money, as though the exchange had actually been
made, and the vendor had received the money and
transferred the land (see 1161, 1260). Although
the legal title to the land would still descend to
the vendor's heirs upon his death, still when the
vendee afterwards completes the contract, takes
a conveyance of the legal title from the heirs,
and pays the price, the money, being all the time
an element of the vendor's assets, and being,
thereforP, all the time a part of his personal and
not of his real property, goes to his administrators or executors, to be by them administered upon with the rest of his personal assets, and does
not go to the heirs. (Emphasis added.)
In regard to equitable conversion, this court said in
Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791 (1964), at
:399, 392:
As a general rule an enforceable ·executory
contract of sale has the effect of converting the
interest of the vendor of real property to personalty.
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The only esseutial requisites to implementatio11 of tJ 11
doctrine of equitable conYersion are that the wndor iu
ternl to sell the land in return for money, and that 1Ji
vendee intend to expPnd tht> money in the 1mn·liasp uf
land; or, in other words, that tlwr(' lit> an PnforcealilP con
tract upon ·which vendors or vendPPS could sne for 81Jecific performance in the event 01w or the other shonlil
refuse to perform their part of the agrt>enwnt. This nquisite is set forth by 4
1159, at 473-74:

1•

. . . No express declaration in the instnum·nt
is needed that land shall be treated as mone.\· although not sold, or that money shall be deemed
land although not actually laid out in the lllHchase of land. The only essential requisitP is an
absolute expn•ssion of an intention that the land
shall be sold and tnnwd into rnom·y, or that tlP
rno1wy shall he l'x11endPd in the purchase of land.
If this intention is sufficiently expressed, the circumstance that the land has not yet been sold
and turned into monoy, or that th<:> mom',\"
Hril
yet been laid out in land, is the very condition ol
fact in which the doctrine of conversion c01111·'
into play, to which the maxim, Equity
that as done which ought to lw done, applies. The
true test in all :::;uch cases is a simple one: Ha$ tlw
will or deed creating the trnst ahsolntely <lir<'cted.
or has the contract stipulatPd, that the real estat1
be turned into personal or Hie personal estate
turned into
']'he satisfaction of this requisite in the instant rm'r'
is
clc•ar, not onl:· from the terms of the agreement
itself, lmt also from the continni11g perfonnance of tl11•
terms of
agn·e11ient by hoth parti<'s as land ,continnei
to he deeded to the purchasers in retnrn for mo1w.1
The agreement contained most of the standard provision;
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of a typical Uniform Real Estate Contract and it is not
f'unh·nded that the vendors did not have an enforceable
eon tract npon which they could have sued.
Regarding the time of conversion where the sale is
:rnbject to option, as per the instant agreement, the rule
is that conversion takes place at the time such option is
exercised.
Where there is a lease with an option of
purchase, conversion will not take place unless
and until the option is exercised, although, where
the lease calls for purchase at its expiration absolutely and without leaving the matter open to
01Jtion, there is a conversion. On exercising the
orltion, the equitable doctrine of constructive conversion of real into personal property is applicahle to lease in which an option to purchase the
dPmised premises is granted to the lessee.
18 Corzms Jiiris Sccimditm 50-51 (1939).

1'he death of the vendor is immaterial with respect
tu el1uitable conversion, as is clear from the following
statement:
An executory contract for the sale of land,
Pnforceable for or against the vendor or vendee,
operates as an equitable conversion. Furthermore,
with respect to the effect of the contract as a convprsion, the death of either vPndor or vendee, even
hefore the time of completion of the contract, is
held to be entirely immaterial. The question in
snch cases is whether, at the time of his death,
the vendor or purchaser, as the case may he, was
either absolutely or contingently under such an
agreement as equity would enforce against him.
at the time of the death of one of
the parties
ers to the validity of the contract,
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and not to conditions that may or may not han
been performed because performance then•of wa,
not due at the time of the death of the h>stator.
It is snfficient if these conditions can be performed by his reprm;entatin•s. \Yhere a contract for
the sale of land might have lieen enforced agai11,1
the vendor had he lived, the conversion from
realty into }Jersonalty may he compleh•d, c'Wn
though the vendee has not paid the purchase prier,
and the contract is executor;· in character.
owr, the fact that the contract is entirt>ly optional
with the purchaser dot>s not affrct the prinC'iple
that the land is to be treated as
if tlw
option is exercised.
27 American Jiirisprndcnce 491-92 (19GG).

In the instant case, the option was exercised in 19G3,
well before the death of plaintiff's husband. Defendant
urges that the conversion occurred at the time the option
was exercised, and that since that time plaintiff, decedPn(
and subsequently decedent's estate haYe had an intern!
in purchase money under the contract and have had no
interest in real estate beyond mere legal title.
At Point I in her brief plaintiff argues tha.t the doctrine of equitable conversion is designed to carry out the
intent of the parties to the contract. This has always
been understood by the defendant to be true. However.
plaintiff apparently belien•s that "intent" refern to
intent to be or not to he taxed. As explained abow.
defendant urges that the true meaning of intent under
the circumstancPs of this case is the intent that rrnl
estate shall he sold for money and the intent that
shall be given for real estate. See 4 Pomeroy § 1159.
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Plaintiff also apparently believes that significance
be attached to the fact that there was no escrow
arrangement under the instant executory contract. Defendant submits, however, that the substance of the rights
and obligations involved in this case are exactly the same
1rith or without an escrow arrangement and that the
existence of such an arrangement would have no substantive relevance in this case. Plaintiff would have no
additional rights and defendant no additional obligations
under an executory contract providing an escrow arr:mgement. An escrow arrangement, like the docfrine of
equitable conversion, has the effect of passing equitable
title in the same fashion as equitable conversion. The
following quotations point out the similarity of result in
escrow and nonescrow situations.
We do not believe that the escrow contract
and performance under it can be so thoroughly
divorced from the lease and compliance with its
terms. While legal title did not pass to the lessee
until the conditions of the escrow agreement were
satisfied, the lessee had, from the time the lease
was placed in escrow and pending performance
of the conditions, an equitable title to the leasehold estate or interest.
C'uu·dcn v. Broderick & Calvert, 114 S.W. 2d 1166, 1169
(Tex. 1938).
It is a well-established principle of equity that
pending the completion of an enforceable executory contract for the sale of real estate, the real
estate is, as to the Yendor, regarded as converted
into personalty from the time of the exectition of
the contract.

Bucher v. Young, 158 N.E. 581, 582, (Ind. 1927)
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Plaintiff cites various authorities indicating that thi:
doctrine of equitable conversion applies only as to \Jl'Ysons whose claims or rights to the property are connected
with its devolution from the owner through the
ment. Defendant agrees. However, plaintiff then argues
that the doctrine does not apply in the instant case, hecause defendant's claim is made irrespective of the par
ties to the agreement. But this is not what the cited authorities require. They do not require that the claim he
made with respect to the parties to the agreement, rather
they require that the claim be connected with the devolution of the property from the author. Defendant's claim
is clearly connected with the devolution of the property.
An inheritance tax, by definition, is a tax on the devolution of property. In this case, it is a tax on the devolution
from decedent to plaintiff of an interest in
money .
. . The [inheritance] tax is an excise or prin
lege tax or duty imposed on the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent, made effectin
by his death, that is, either on the transmission
or the exercise of the legal power to transmi!
property, or on the right to succeed to, receive,
or take property, by or under a will, or the intestacy laws, or deed, grant, or gift to hecome operative at or after death.

85 Corzms Juris Secu11dwn 844-45 (1954).
Inasmuch as an inheritance tax is not a tax on real
property, hut a tax on the transfer of property, real or
personal, the case;,; cited by plaintiff belaboring the poin!
that equitable conversion may not be reliPd on to subject
real property to taxation are not pertinent in the instant
10

ease. Those cases are J,atta v. Jenkins, 200 N.C. 255,
J:"iG S.E. 857 (1931); Heymann v. Viane, 252 N.Y. 159,
169 N.E. 124 (1929); McCurdy v. McCurdy, 197 Mass.
2±8, f{.l N.K 881 (IUOS); Laitrel Hill Cemetery Associatir)}/, 184 P.2d 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); and New Jersey
!Tiqlnvay Authority v. Henry A. Raensch Coal Co., 40
N.J. Super Ct. 355, A.2d 83 (1956). Heymann v. Viane
i.' all the more extraneous because the issue is one of
jnri:-diction between different states. And Laurel Hill
may be further distinguished from the instant case by the
fact that there equitable conversion was urged in aid of
an exemption from taxation. The court said at 163:
If the court applied the doctrine of equitable
conversion in this case by treating the land as
money it would have to go out of its way to invoke
a legal fiction in aid of an exemption from taxation. This would run counter to the rule that exemptions must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer which rule is settled by many authorities
In the present case the doctrine is urged in opposition to an exemption from taxation, which use comports
with the established rule.
In re Destuer's Estate, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 738 (1950),
relied upon heavily by plaintiff, is also easily distinguished from the instant case. Not only did the question
of jurisdiction between states underlie the question of
whether equitable conversion ought to apply in that case,
hut the doctrine was urged, again, to exempt a transfer
from an inheritance tax. The court held that the d0ctrine
wonl<l not apply to exclude certain real property from a
11omesident decedent's taxable estate.
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In the present case, the property in question is that
of a resident and is situated in this state. While then
may be good reason not to apply the doctrine when it j 0
advanced to subject to taxa tiou foreign real property of
a resident, and while there may be reason to disallow
the doctrine when i,t is advanced in support of exempting
from taxation domestic real property of a nonresi(leut,
those instances involve distinct interstate policy considerations which are not a concern here. \Ve arc concerned here with whether domestic property of a resi<lrnt
should be held to have been converted to a personal iHterest in purchase money where such was the intent of
the transferors and where to treat transferors' interest
as an interest in real property would be contrary to thv
intent of the transferors. Decedent and plaintiff
sold an option to purchase the property and then, witl1
the exercise of the option, sold the property. Actual conveyances of portions of the property sold began, continued until the death of the decedent, and continue at
present. The agreement between decedent and plaintiff
on the one hand and purchasers on the other employs the
terms "buyers," "sellers," "sell," and "purchase''
throughout. Buyers entered into immediate possession
at the time the option was purchased. Since that time,
plaintiff has not at any time been in possession. Nine
payments were made by purchasers prior to decedent'>
death and a warranty deed was conveyed by decedent to
purchasers wi·th each payment. Payments and land release continue at present. Plaintiff and her decedent warranted that the property sold was subject to no liens
or encumbrances other than those which appeared of re
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cord. Tliey also warranted that they would not encumber
tlic r;roperty during the life of the agreement. Buyers
in the beginning the payment of annual water
tuxes, property taxes and other taxes and assessments on
tl1c whole property and have since paid such taxes and
:i:.;sesf.lments. Sellers agreed to assist buyers in buyers'
denlopment of the property. Buyers were allowed to
make improvements on the non-deeded portion of the
coJJtrnct property. Sellers agreed to furnish buyers at
the time set for exercise of the option with an abstract of
title showing a marketable title and did in fact furnish
huyers with such an abstract when buyers in fact did
exercise the option. Finally, the agreement by its terms
is binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, and
assigns of the parties.
These facts amply demonstrate the sellers' intent
to sell. It would be manifestly inequitable and incongrnom; to suspend tha:t intention long enough to allow
the property to be exempted from the full inheritance
tax through an attachment of a dower interest, and then
resume recognition of that intention for purposes of
eompleting the terms of the agreement.
In her brief, plaintiff next cites two hypotheticals
ost(msihly militating against applica:tion of equitable conrersion in the instant case. However, the attitudes and
actions insidiously attributed in each hypothetical to the
Commission, which allow plaintiff to allege_ inequitable
results in each hypothetical, are so attributed without foundation. With regard ot the first hypotheti-
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cal, who is to say that wife B would not be entitled
to do\ver to the extent of one-third of the entire $100,000.00 Also, this hypothetical is based upon the err 011 .
eous assumption that every widow is always entitled to
exclude from an inherited estate one-third of all real
estate within the state. That is clearly not the purpose of
the dower statute. The purpose of the sfatute is to insure
that the wife will not be left without at least a portion of
the decedent's property with which to care for herself. In
the instant case, the decedent has clearly provided an1ph
for plaintiff. She will, in fact, receive one-half of the
proceeds of the agreement in question, which is more
than her statutory one-third interest and will clearly
provide for her better than if she received one-third of
the property subject to the agreement. It is clear that
the legislature did not intend one-third of all properties
within the State of Utah to be excludable from
estate. This is illustrated by Utah Code Ann. § 74-4-j
(1953), which only gives the wife one-third of the pror1erty to which she had rnade no relinquislime11t of her
rights. Also, this statute makes an exception for a wife
who does not reside within the State of Utah and doe'
not give a non-resident wife any entitlement whatsoever
to any of the husband's real propery within the State of
Utah. Furthermore, if a man places his real estate i11
trust and the wife concurs in the trust, then the wife i;
not entitled to her one-third stafotory share. Finally,
more property in the State of Utah is held in joint tenancy than by any other method, and a widow is not entitled to a statutory share of joint tenancy property.
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The result set forth by plaintiff in the second hypotJ1dical is due to the enoneous assumption on the part
ol tlw plaintiff that the Commission would seek to apply
tlic· doctrine of equitable conversion indiscriminately,
,1·i1 hout regard to the circumstances of each case. This is
:;in11il)- not true. As admitted by plaintiff, the doctrine
fJ\' equitable conversion is meant to be applied on a case
Ii>- rn:w basis, subject to the circumstances in each case.
Thu result set forth in the second hypothetical depends
llpon the application of the doctrine to exempt a local
t ran:;fer from taxation. It is absurd to believe that the
Commission would argue for such an application.
First Security Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass'n.. v. Rogers,
±2<J P.2d 38(), (Idaho 1967), and First National Bank of
lfigli1a111l Park v. Boston Insurance Co., 17 Ill. 2d 147,
lGO N.E. 2d 802 (1959), cited in plaintiff's brief at
Point II, are no more than examples of the proposition
propounded by plaintiff that the doctrine of equitable
depends upon the circumstances under which
it i1:l invoked and is not a fixed rule of law. In First
8!'rnrity Ba11k the applicability of the doctrine was actnally immaterial to the outcome of the case. The doctrine was asserted in that case in an a:tfompt to avoid a
judgment lien against real properly which had been sold,
hut not yet conveyed. The party asserting the doctrine
r·.Jaimed that the vendors' interest in the property had
hecome an interest in personalty to which the judgment
li('n could not attach. Contrary to the interpretation
gin·n the case by plaintiff here, the court in First Security Bank actually ruled that equitable conversion had
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taken place, but that conversion would not preclude the
a;ttaclnnent of the judgment lien to the interest in personalty which resulted. The court said at 389:
·where an interest in realty is subject to liens
of judgment and such interest is transformed into
personalty by sale of the realt)', a court having
custody of the proceeds of sale should, in
Pxercise of its equity jurisdiction, extend the
judgment liens to the proceeds, so as to resolw
the creditors' conflicting claims to priority.
In light of the aboYe quotation, any language of tlw
court in that case indicating that it considered equitahlP
conversion inapplicable must be taken as ineffectual. Any
such language must be considered as an indication that
the court misunderstood the doctrine as antornatically
precluding the attachment to personalty of a judgment
lien awarded against realty.
In First National Bank, a vendor-vendee-insurer
case, the court held that the doctrine of equitable conversion could not be applied to fix upon the contract
price as an absolute measure of the value of certain property destroyed by fire, because there were factors which
indicated to the court that the contract should not he tlw
measure of value. The court did not rule that the contract
price should not be the measure of value hecausE' the
doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply, rather it
ruled that the doctrine of equitable conversion does not
apply because the contract price should not be thr
measure of value, a conclusion reached for indt>pendrnt
reasons.
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Dcf endant urges that the circumstances of the inc;tant case are appropriate for application of the doctrine
of equitahle conversion in order to recognize and carry
ont the intentions of the parties to the agreement of sale.

POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S SIGNATURE ON THE AGREEj[P,NT WAS A RELINQUISHMENT OF HER
RJGHTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.§ 74-4-3 (1953).
Utah Code Awn. § 74-4-3 (1953) gives to a surviving
wife one-third the value of all legal or equitable estates in
real property possessed by her husband, if she has not relinquished her rights to it. It is clear that a wife's signature on a
as a seller constitutes a relinquislunent of her rights to property transferred by the
contract. fo re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P.2d
595 ( 1953), was a case similar to the instant case. There
a widO\v claimed she had not relinquished her dower to
real property and was entitled to her statutory interest
in it, even though she had executed with her husband a
rontract to sell the property. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court said:
... Nevertheless it is true that the courts
cannot preserve and hold for a widow sornething
which she has volwtfarily sold or disposed of.
Dower cannot he revived at the cost of a wife's
liberty to contract. The Court cannot arbitrarily
vitiate a sale that has been voluntarily maQ.e .
1

. . . We are of the opinion and so hold that
a married woman, being able to buy, sell, own
and dispose of real property as freely as her
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husband is subject to the rules of estoppel ... :\
married woman although undL·r eovPrtnn• a( tl11·
timt> may by OJI.If lc.r;ul form of co1ffe.1;m1ce diust
herself of her dower right, aud such conveyance
will Ol)('l"(lte as an cstu1Jpcl. To permit her to
rqmdiate her act irnuld be to allow her to m1llify
the very thi11g she lws l1y lair ber11 ]Jermitted to
do. (Citations omitted.)
. . . Appellants further maintain that ...
she did not relinquish her do\\"er in the land by
joining with lwr husband in his signing of the . .'.
contract. In support of their position appellants
cite a number of a nthori ties. (Citations omitted).
All of these anthoritiPs may be distinguished from
the case at bar by the fact that [she] did actually
join with [her husband] in thP same instrument.
The fact that [her husband] executed thP ...
contract as a representative of [a corporntion]
did not change his marital status, and 1clu 11 [she]
signed the same instrun11·1d icith him she sir;11c1I
as his u.·ife, 1((11d in so doi11g relinquished her i11choatc right of don·er in the real ]JrDfJcrty cuurcrl
by that contract ... She is now precluded from
rqmdiati 11g her act or clnimi11r7 against the 'Contract she executed, by asserting a divested right.
To permit her tu du so would allow lier to zicrpet11ate a u·ro11.r;, contrary to law a11d equity .
1

. . . The wife has only one right of dower in
one piece of property. If she di\'ests herself of
that right she no longer has it. It is not a question of resuscitating a dormant right. The right
she had is gone, it no longer exists. To hold otherwise would mean a complete release of dower
could never he effected. Whatever int0rest, if
any, a lrnshaml may have in a contract of sale, i'
not snh,iect to wife's dower, when in absence of
fraud, the wife has voluntarily disposed of such
right. ( Bmphasis added).
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In re illadse11's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P.2cl 595, at
3JJ-46, 603-4 ( 1953).

It is clear from this case that a wife can relinquish
her rights by signing a contract of sale. Title 7 of the
Title Standards of the Utah State Bar states that in
order to have marketable title, the wife's signature must
be 011 the contract. This means that if plaintiff's argulllPnt prevails - that such a signature does not relinquish
dower - literally thousands of real estate titles in the
Sta to of Utah would be in jeopardy. It would be impossihk· for attorneys and title insurance companies to know
whether a wife had properly relinquished her dower interest.

Since one of the terms of the agreement was that the
f'ellers would furnish an abstract of title showing the
pro1wrty to be free and clear of all encumbrances and in
gPnrral show a marketable title, her signature must have
been a relinquishment of her statutory rights.
Furthermore, the contract signed by plaintiff constitntes a "conveyance" within the meaning of Utah Code
A1111.
57-1-1 (1953). This supports the conclusion that
plaintiff relinquished her dower right in the property
subject to the contract which she signed as seller.
Plaintiff has no more rights in the real estate m
qiwstion than she would have if she had signed a warrnnty deed and taken back a mortgage on the property.
Tn 0ither case the purchaser is entitled to treat the propin all respects as his mvn, provided payments are
made. In either case plaintiff has only a chose in action.
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Plaintiff certainly doe;,; not claim that she does not
desire or is not required to complete the conveyance of
the property to the purcha:::;ers upon full payment b)'
them. Nor does I>laintiff claim to he presently entitled
to one-third of the real property in question. To do so
would be to contradict the agreement which she has
signed. The intentions of the parties to that agreenwnt
may not be suspended long enough for plaintiff's dmrn
right to attach for purposes of avoiding inheritance tax
and subst>quently be reinstated for purposes of carrying
out the terms of the agreement.
Defendant urges that plaintiff's sole motive in asserting dower in this case is the prospect of avoiding inheritance tax. Defendant urges that plaintiff has re- ,
linquished her dower right and that the tax assessment
on the property, which defendant contends has been converted into personalty, was properly assessed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant urges this Honorable Court to affirm the
judgment of the district court upholding the accuracy
of the full inheritance tax assessed against plaintiff by
defendant. Defendant urges as a basis for sustaining tlw
district court two alternative arguments. Under one a '
dower right of plaintiff does not attach so as to exempt
from inheritance taxation one-third of the real estate subject to the agreement in question, because with respect to
plaintiff and her deceased husband the inten•st was con- ,
vE>rted at the time purchasers exercised their option un·
der the agreement from an interest in realty to an inter20

in iwrsonalty, to which dower does not attach. Under
the other a dower right of plaintiff does not attach so as
to exempt from inheritance taxation one-third of the real
estate subject to the argument in question, because plaintiff relinquished her right to dower in that property by
signing the sales agreement as a vendor and as the
\\'ife of the other vendor.
Defendant urges that plaintiff seeks to establish a
do\n:•r interest in the real property subject to the sale
not for the purpose of avoiding the sale or retaining
a real or practical interest in the realty, but solely for the
pnrpose of avoiding inheritance tax properly and accuratel:v assessed.
For these reasons defendant urges this Honorable
Court to affirm the decision of the district court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
G. BLAINE DAVIS
Asst. Attorney General
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defe-ndantRespondent
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